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Money and value: a synthesis of the state 
theory of money and original institutional 
economics
Georgios Papadopoulos
Abstract: The paper proposes a synthesis of original institutional economics 
and in particular of the work of John R. Commons with the state theory of 
money, constructing a theoretical framework for the analysis of economic 
value in relation to money. The argument developed resists the naturalistic, 
individualistic, neoclassical analysis of value, proposing an account based on 
antagonism and negotiation framed by social institutions and more specifically 
by the institution of money. Money plays an active role in the process of the 
constitution of the system of prices, creating possibilities of mediation in the 
conflicts around the distribution of social production and contributing towards 
the establishment of ‘reasonable value’ in economic transactions. 
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Introduction
One could argue that value is one of the most important concepts in economic 
analysis; it provides the necessary measure for the comparison and the exchange of 
commodities, allowing for the constitution of the market and the division of labor. 
Economic agents rely heavily on economic value and they predicate all their market 
interactions upon the given, or the expected, prices of commodities and services. 
The aim of this paper is to investigate economic value and its relation to money, 
based on a combination of the state theory of money, or chartalism, (Ingham 1996, 
2004, 2006; Innes, 1913, 1914; Keynes 1930; Knapp 1924/ 1905; Wray 1990) and The Journal of Philosophical Economics VI:2 (2013) 3
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original institutional economics (Bush and Tool 2003; Commons 1934/ 1961; Foster 
1941/1981a, 1949/1981b; Tool 1986, 2000; Tool and Samuels 1989; Veblen 1899/1994). 
Original institutional economics, in particular, emphasizes that what is seen as 
valuable, as well as rational or legitimate, is influenced by social rules that create a 
plurality of systems of evaluation organized around their own criteria. Institutions 
other than the market and factors other than the forces of supply and demand have 
a purchase in the formation of the price system. The reliance of economic value 
to institutions can be further elaborated using the concept of ‘transaction’ and the 
principle of ‘reasonable value’ both introduced by Commons (Commons 1924, 1924/ 
1957, 1934/ 1961).
Money should be analyzed as an institution that supports and organizes the process 
of economic valuation rather than just a medium of indirect economic exchange 
(Papadopoulos 2009). Two of its most recognized functions, namely those of a store 
and a standard of value are connected to economic value. The comparison and the 
appraisal of the analysis of economic value, its meaning and its constitution, across 
the different theories of money can be employed as the frame for the analysis of 
economic value of its meaning, of its preconditions and of the relation of value to 
money. The conceptual analysis of value should also refer to social ontology in an 
attempt to illuminate the foundations of the notion of value. In order to include all 
the social and institutional determinants of valuation, it is important to reorientate 
the analysis of value away from individualism and to connect it with the theory of 
social existence, in order to liberate economic value form psychologism and to dispel 
the scientistic pretense of the neoclassical analysis that is deeply invested in the 
ideas of rationality, naturalism and individualism (Mirowski 1991a, 1991b). 
The structure of the paper is as follows. In the next section some preliminary 
remarks about value are made, describing the properties of economic value, its 
relations to price, money and utility. In section three a criticism of the neoclassical 
analysis of price and money is offered focusing on the shortcomings of the quantity 
and the commodity theories of money. Section four analyses economic value from 
the perspective of the state theory of money, or chartalism, explaining the relevance 
of power and of antagonism in the process of economic valuation. Section fives 
builds an institutionalist analysis of economic value, by employing the work of John 
R. Commons and particularly notions of transaction and reasonable value. Section 
six concludes, offering a synthesis of the analysis of money as the institution that 
regulates valuation and allows for the government to intervene and mediate on the 
antagonism around the organization of the system of prices.  The Journal of Philosophical Economics VI:2 (2013) 4
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Understanding value
Value denotes worth, utility, price, and usefulness; these descriptions suggest the 
allegiance of the notion value to a pragmatist attitude, a notion that combines 
utilitarian, economic and ethical criteria. Dewey observed ‘that praise, prize and 
price are all derived from the same Latin word; that appreciate and appraise 
were once used inter-changeably; and that ‘dear’ is used as equivalent both to 
‘precious’ and to ‘costly’ in monetary price’ (Dewey 1939/ 1988, pp. 195). Along 
with pragmatism comes also the practical sense of value and its ability to order 
and quantify; quantification is possible through the reduction of the properties of 
valued objects to a common quantity that gives value its uniform content. The most 
familiar example of value today comes from the market, a system of exchange and 
valuation that organizes all commodities in terms of their price, which is expressed 
by a shared unit of account. 
When we speak of value, we need to refer to an object. Still, the valued object does 
not acquire a new intrinsic quality when someone deems it valuable; it is valued 
because of the appreciation of the qualities that it has, while it’s meaning and its 
identity are not affected by the question of whether or not it has a value and how 
much this value may be. Consequently, value is not a feature or a property that 
is part of the identity or the ‘nature’ of the objects; value is not intrinsic to them 
and cannot be ‘inferred from their mere natural existence or content’ (Simmel 
1900/ 1990, pp. 59). Value is relative and dependent on the intentionality [1] of the 
observer(s), while valuation emerges as an individual psychological occurrence that 
is situated in subjective consciousness; it is a judgment conferred upon an object by 
a subject and remains inherent to the subject. [2] In that respect evaluation is akin 
to intentionality, a directness upon the word that creates a new representation of 
objects organizing them in a system of valuation. 
The subjective basis of valuation does not preclude the possibility of a shared system 
of values or a collective valuation of objects. The fact that value is a subjective 
mental-state indicates that value is ontologically subjective, i.e. that it exists because 
of subjective attitudes and that it is located in the mind of the subject. Ontological 
subjectivity does not preclude epistemological objectivity; the content of valuation 
can be dependent on specific traits that are shared and can be appraised by inter-
subjective criteria. Narratives and institutions raise value from the domain of 
subjective valuation into an inter-subjective organizing substance. As long as value 
has to follow certain rules and be part of a specific conversation, certain criteria The Journal of Philosophical Economics VI:2 (2013) 5
Papadopoulos, Georgios (2013) ‘Money and value: a synthesis of  
the state theory of money and original institutional economics’,  
The Journal of Philosophical Economics, VI:2
of appraisal arise that exceed the individual and refer to the collective. When 
we talk about aesthetic, economic, moral, or political value, we need to refer to a 
standard, a narrative and a set of institutions that provide valuation with content 
and a set of criteria of appraisal. The passage from subjective to inter-subjective 
value is premised upon the emergence of a shared, collective intentionality that 
constitutes shared valuations. The negotiation of individual valuation in the social 
domain marks this passage to a shared inter-subjective valuation that is collectively 
acknowledged. The system of prices is an example of how individual judgments 
of value can lead to a coherent system of valuation that is accepted by the group 
of individuals participating in a market. The constitution of inter-subjective 
valuation allows for the possibility of an objectivity of value, an objectivity that is 
epistemological rather than ontological.
The constitution of economic value is a process of abstraction and insertion of 
objects, subjects and relations in the price system with the mediation of money. [3] 
Commodities need to forgo their qualities and become interchangeable in terms 
of price; their identity becomes irrelevant, while their qualities are reduced to the 
absolute quantity of economic value. Money dissolves the particularities of objects, 
fixes them as commodities and creates the system of prices as a system of meaning. 
Money expresses the content of commodities, economic value that organizes 
them around the discourse of the market giving to the system of prices a uniform 
organizing substance. Signs of utility, cost, beauty or personal attachment are 
reduced to economic value and employed as a support of the system of prices. In a 
further move that completes commodification, the qualities of the objects that are 
commodified, are called back as the rationale of their price (Papadopoulos 2011, pp. 
53-54). 
Ronald Coase delineated the subject-matter of economics, as everything that can 
be quantified by the ‘measuring rod of money’ (Coase 1994, pp. 44). The imposition 
of the economic logic on social reality passes through the re-constitution of society 
as a market. Prices communicate the content of social constitution, organizing a 
signifying chain where all commodities are inserted as signifieds of economic value 
in accordance to their prices. Signification is regulated by money, the standard of 
economic value, which supports and quilts the signifying chain of commodities, 
effectively constituting the system of prices. Economic value, the ultimate meaning 
of all commodities and services in the market, remains nonetheless relative, a 
relativity that is never eliminated but always remains obscured by money. All 
commodities need to refer to other commodities and in the final analysis to money The Journal of Philosophical Economics VI:2 (2013) 6
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in order to establish their value. Money refers only to itself. The self-referentiality 
of money constructs the ultimate foundation of economic value. Money inserts all 
commodities in the signifying chain by subsuming their differences to a uniform 
substance (difference reduced to identity). Value, the organizing substance of the 
economy, is anchored onto money, and money as the abstract standard of value can 
organize the system of commodities, exactly because of its self-referentiality. [4] 
The fallacies of the neoclassical analysis on  
money and value
In mainstream economics, the relation between value and money is explained by 
two interconnected theories; the commodity theory of money that defines money as 
a medium of exchange, emerging as the unintended consequence of the activities of 
utility maximizing individuals, and the quantity theory of money that explains the 
value of money via the dynamics of its supply and demand. The two theories share a 
commitment to rationality, individualism, and equilibrium dynamics as their main 
methodological principles at the same time as they propose formal representations of 
their content as the expression of their scientificity. A criticism of the foundations 
of the neoclassical analysis of the relation between economic value and money 
is developed in this section of the paper, explaining why these two accounts of 
economic value and of money are insufficient, effectively clearing the ground for an 
alternative explanation of value that draws from the state theory of money and from 
original institutional economics.   
The commodity and the quantity theories of money put utility in the center of 
their analysis of value. Consumers aim at the maximization of individual utility 
through the employment of their resources in the market. Utility as the foundation 
of economic value allows for the possibility of the naturalization of the concept 
of economic value; by referring to utility, value can be traced to the natural 
psychological make up the individual and the causal (i.e. scientific) laws that 
regulate the satisfaction of the individual needs and desires. Still, the investigation 
of these causal laws is relegated by mainstream economics to psychology and the 
factors that influence the individual calculations of utility are placed in a ‘black 
box’. Value is revealed through consumers’ subjective preferences and their actions 
to satisfy their preferences through bilateral exchanges. Simply put, economic value 
originates in utility, with price being the measure of value and value a measure of 
utility. [5] Economic value is consequently defined as value in exchange; it expresses The Journal of Philosophical Economics VI:2 (2013) 7
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the exchange relations of each and every commodity with all the other commodities 
in the marketplace expressed by a universal unit of account. 
The commodity theory of money, suggests that money and the system of prices 
emerge as the unintended consequence of bilateral commodity exchanges, but 
the conditions for the constitution of an all-encompassing and fully developed 
system of prices from bilateral barter exchanges is not theoretically specified. The 
passage from bilateral barter exchanges, established on the basis of individual 
preferences, to free market equilibrium and the supporting system of prices is by 
no means automatic as the representation of the market as a system of equations 
suggests. The question is of course how a universally accepted unit of account 
emerges from bilateral exchanges and as a result it facilitates the quantification of 
value, its uniform expression in the market, and the equilibration of supply for all 
commodities at a single price. The problem is quite complex because if the starting 
point of the analysis is the usual assumptions of complete information, unlimited 
computational capabilities and absence of time constrains are used to specify the 
trading agents (as in general equilibrium theorizing), no need for a unit of account 
emerges (Hahn 1965), and if a more realistic description of the transacting parties 
is used then the task of calculating the exchange rates and translating them to 
a uniform standard becomes nearly impossible (Davies 2002, pp. 15-16; Ingham 
2004, pp. 25). Even if one accepts the, prima facie unrealistic, assumptions of 
complete information, rationality, and maximization, bilateral exchanges of 
commodities cannot lead to the emergence of a common commodity standard, i.e. 
to the constitution of a shared unit of account, exactly because bilateral trades do 
not convey information in terms of value for any further bilateral exchange, but 
rather manifest comparisons of individual wants. [6] The comparison of individual 
needs does not add into the emergence of a general standard of value, since bilateral 
exchanges only refer to the very commodities exchanged and the individual 
valuation of these commodities, rather than to a generally accepted means of 
exchange, that can lead to a generalized measurement of value. In the standard 
Walrasian story, and subsequently in the general equilibrium analysis, the problem 
is resolved through the introduction of an ‘auctioneer’, a deus ex machina, who calls 
out prices and quantities, overseeing the process of ‘tâtonnement’, a process that 
presupposes, rather than produces, prices and money.
The commodity theory of money argues that the value of money is a consequence 
of its commodity nature and the utility that its use offers. The establishment 
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another commodity’, championed by the commodity theory. Fiat-money tokens are 
intrinsically worthless, while their cost of production negligible and consequently 
their supply completely elastic in relation to demand at least endogenously. The 
exchange of valuable commodities for worthless tokens, or objects that do not have a 
utility in themselves, has been recognized as a paradox already at the early stages of 
the commodity theory. [7] Nevertheless, neoclassical analysis insists that even in the 
case of fiat money it is the forces of supply and demand, and ultimately the utility 
of money, that define the value of money, as in the case of every other commodity. 
Explaining money in terms of supply and demand gave rise to the quantity theory 
of money, already formulated by Hume in the 18th century and still reigning today, 
updated to the contemporary versions of monetarism. The quantity theory does not 
spend too much time on the questions of what money is, or how it finds its way 
in the economy. The main question of the quantity theory occupies itself with is 
how much of money is demanded at any given moment (Ingham 2004, pp. 20). A 
mathematical expression of the (updated) quantity theory of money can be written 
as follows: MV + M¹V¹ = ΣpQ = PT. Notes and coins in circulation are represented by 
(M), while checkable deposits are (M¹); Vs are the velocities; p the monetary price of 
any good; Q its quantity and P the general level of prices (Ingham 2004, pp. 21). 
Two important questions remain open in the quantity theory; the problem of the 
identification of the money supply, or as it is presented in the related literature, 
the problem of an empirical definition of money, as well as the question of 
the mechanism of transmission whereby a change in the quantity of money 
influences the level of prices. The two problems are obviously related; if one 
cannot identify money proper, then it is difficult, if not impossible, to establish an 
empirical relation between the quantity demanded and the prices. The problem of 
identification relates with the distinction between money and credit, a fundamental 
problem also for the commodity theory. [8] As long as credit is considered to be a 
substitute for currency, and not as money proper, it is not included in the quantity 
of money, and the analysis cannot take into consideration the money created by 
financial intermediation. As the operation of commercial banks becomes more 
developed and different types of instruments are created to facilitate deposits and 
credit, the quantity theory is unable to provide a reliable measure for the quantity 
or velocity of the monetary value, and of the different types of money, near monies 
and money substitutes that circulate in the market. The different types of money 
that the quantity theory proposed in order to demarcate money proper from its 
substitutes range from M0 and M1 reach up to M8 (or even M10), in order to cover 
the different instantiations of assets and credit money (Kaufman 1969; Laidler The Journal of Philosophical Economics VI:2 (2013) 9
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1969). The plethora of near monies is indicative of the impossibility of the task of 
the empirical definition of money and without a clear identification of what money 
is, it is also very difficult to explain the relation between the quantity of money, its 
velocity, the level of prices and in the final analysis of economic value. 
A different explanatory gap of the quantity theory of money refers to the 
fundamental relation of the quantity of money and to the level of prices. It is not 
clear how the quantity of money influences the level of prices and it is logically 
possible that the two quantities are not directly correlated. The only theoretical 
argument for the validity of the quantity theory seems to be the intuition, that 
money as any other commodity fluctuates in value depending on its supply; more 
money, less value, higher prices and vice versa. The theory assumes that money is 
a commodity, or functions as one; if the commodity identity of money is the only 
support for the relation between quantity and price the explanation is circular. In 
absence of any further theoretical argument, it is conceivable that high prices lead 
to an increase in the supply or/ and in the velocity of money, suggesting a causal 
relation in the opposite direction than what the commodity theory suggests. Money 
can flow towards high prices in order to avoid further increases in the price level 
(see for example the price/ money movements in the stock market or the behavior of 
agents in an environment of hyperinflation). 
The quantity theory cannot establish the relation between the quantity of money 
and the price level, except through a tautological explanation that follows from the 
commodity identity of money, stemming from the commodity theory of money that 
relates to the quantity theory. The relationship between the quantity of money and 
the level of prices cannot be established empirically, since the supply of money is 
neither tractable nor quantifiable, as long as money proper cannot be demarcated 
form credit and other money substitutes. The failures to define economic value 
in an independent and satisfactory manner is the outcome of a fundamental 
misunderstanding of the identity of money and of value, which is caused by the 
attachment to the dated commodity theory of money, and to individualism, both 
methodological and ontological (Papadopoulos 2009). 
Neoclassical analysis of money and of economic value does not seem to be able to go 
further from a formal description of the flow of economic value and commodities 
described by general equilibrium dynamics. In the context of general equilibrium, 
money is redundant and indistinguishable from other commodities, while economic 
value remains caught in its tautological relation to utility and price. The function 
of money is to maintain the appearances of consistency and legitimacy of the price The Journal of Philosophical Economics VI:2 (2013) 10
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system; it emerges as a self-referential measure of value, with no qualities in itself, 
that reduces the qualities of all commodities to the absolute quantity of an ever 
elusive economic value. 
Value and the state theory of money 
The starting point of the proposed analysis of money is the outright rejection of 
the idea that there might be an optimal quantity supply of money and consequently 
a value of money that is determined by the propensities of the ‘real’ economy. The 
production of money is considered to be distinct and relatively autonomous from 
the production of commodities and the system of prices is the outcome of a process 
of negotiation and conflict between different stakeholders in the economy; between 
capital and labor, between producers and consumers, and more importantly between 
debtors and creditors with the government being the arbiter of these negotiations 
(Ingham 2004; Ferguson 2008; Tool and Samuels 1989). Institutions and social 
discourse, including scientific theories, provide the structure for this negotiation, 
with money playing the pivotal role in regulating and symbolizing the system of 
social exchange; the relation between capital and labor is represented through 
wages, the relation between consumers and producers through price, the relation 
between the state and its citizens through taxation, and the relation between 
debtors and creditors through interest rates. Economic value should be defined and 
subsequently quantified in the context of the institutional framework of the social 
negotiation of value, which organizes commodities and facilitates the possibility of 
their purchase. [9]
Value and money are not defined in exchange; it is rather that the terms of 
exchange that are the outcome of the negotiation around the constitution of value 
that is regulated through money. The very notion of value originates in the social 
obligations that are constituted and organized by the fundamental social relation 
between the individual and the community. The notion of Wergeld, or ‘honorable 
payment’, the primordial means of compensation for damages, is the predecessor of 
social and economic value. The elements of sacrifice and debt as formative of the 
fundamental social bond provide the historical roots of value and of the process of 
social valuation. [10] The origin of value in Wergeld is not just a historical fact, 
but also an indication of a fundamental structure that points to a theoretically 
coherent explanation of economic value, which organizes social facts in terms of a 
shared social narrative. The organization of the system of social relations in terms The Journal of Philosophical Economics VI:2 (2013) 11
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of indebtedness, suggests that the very act of valuation and the concept of value, 
predate the market. [11] The remuneration of compensations sets the foundation 
for a cardinal taxonomy of different social relations, integrating the various aspects 
of social life in an overarching taxonomy and introducing the very possibility 
of evaluation and comparison of different social facts, elevating value from the 
individual to the communal level. The hierarchy of obligations defines the position 
of the individual in society on the basis of a system of social indebtedness towards 
its group and the community. 
 The important distinguishing characteristic of the institutional account of value 
is connected with a critical stance towards individualism. Individualistic analyses 
of utility are problematized in the sense that the attitudes and the habits that 
inform utility are considered to be socially conditioned. Customs and institutions 
are not just forces that influence social valuation, but rather they are the primary 
source of utility assessments and consequently of value. Value is primarily a social 
construction, rather than an individual calculation. The difference seems small 
initially, but is methodologically critical. In neoclassical analysis each individual 
comes in the marketplace to satisfy its needs and desires, resulting to a market 
system of valuations that is expressed in the system of prices. According to the 
institutional analysis, the social interaction creates the needs at the same time as it 
suggests the means of satisfaction. The resulting system of valuation, even though 
can assume the same format, i.e. it can manifest itself as a system of prices, is the 
result of culture and institutions that are in a mutually constitutive relation with 
individual needs. In this theoretical framework, the individual and its preferences 
are not exogenous and are not relegated in the study of individual psychology, but 
rather fall inside the scope of the institutional analysis. 
Money is related to the system of social hierarchies and obligations, where value 
emerges. According to the state theory, money proper emerges only with taxation, 
which signals the establishment of authority as the ultimate judge and mediator of 
social relations. Taxation is the standardization and quantification of the system 
of social relations and obligations, which is organized around the imposition of a 
uniform standard of value. The passage from Wergeld to money proper and from 
social indebtedness to taxation is an outcome of the centralization of agrarian 
societies, of the resulting division of labor, of the production of a surplus and 
the emergence of a leisure class. The division of labor between productive and 
unproductive groups in society requires a formal mechanism of redistribution of 
resources that can safeguard the survival of all the classes and the rationalization The Journal of Philosophical Economics VI:2 (2013) 12
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of the system of distribution. The social bond, and the consequent sense of social 
indebtedness, is presupposed; the distinguishing characteristic of money is that 
it emerges as the institution only when production and distribution emerge as 
relatively autonomous spheres of life, obeying economic and subsequently monetary 
principles. The creation of an economic logic is marked by the emergence of money 
in a similar vein as the passage to history is defined by the introduction of writing.
Money is valuable because it is established by the state as legal tender. Nevertheless, 
the acceptability of money is not just the outcome of a mere declaration. The state 
supports the status of money as legal tender and substantiates its value through 
taxation. Currency is a debt of the state towards the community, issued at the name 
of that community. Taxation functions not only as a way for the state to amass 
resources; it is also a mechanism through which the state-money/ state-debt is 
neutralized. The acceptability of money and the operation of the economic system 
depend on a continuous process of payment and repayment, ‘that is flux-reflux of 
debits and credits’ (Ingham 2004, pp. 83).  As long money is fiat, the expectations 
about the future price of money depends on the credibility of the monetary 
authority, its commitment to maintain a responsible monetary practice, and the 
ability to exhibit its resilience and independence on the face of challenges from 
different stakeholders of the economy, which aim to interfere with monetary policy 
in order to influence the value of money and increase their revenues from the social 
production.
The state intervenes in the social antagonism for the division of the social 
production, both through fiscal and through monetary means. The monetary system 
is one of the main mechanism that such economic policies are implemented, directly 
in the case of monetary measures, indirectly in the instances of fiscal interventions. 
Government policies tamper with the value of money and the system of prices 
effectively intervening in the distribution of goods and services. The state can 
influence the value of money through the control of the interest rates and through 
intervention in the foreign exchange markets. The interest rates do not only regulate 
the relations between debtors and creditors, they also have an indirect an impact on 
the overall economic activity and the relations between producers and consumers 
through its repercussions on investment and savings. The manipulation of the 
external exchange rate affects directly the domestic system of prices. The state is 
the biggest debtor and creditor in the economic system, and because of its size and 
its role in the economy, it determines with its choices the direction of the economic 
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services; ‘it also determines its [money’s] substantive value by influencing what must 
be done in the economy in order to earn the income to pay the tax’ (Ingham 2004, pp. 
84). 
The monetary and the fiscal policies allow the state to change the value of money 
effectively transforming the economic relations between the economic agents. The 
monetary system is not a set of mechanical relations between public spending and 
the level of prices but rather the outcome of the policy of an agent that lies in the 
center of economic and social antagonism. In this context money emerges as an 
autonomous institution in the economy, one that is constituted according to its own 
rules and norms. These rules and norms define the value of money and the system of 
prices. In order to investigate the dynamics of economic value we need to investigate 
the dynamics of social antagonism in the context of the monetary institutions that 
shape and regulate the process of economic valuation. 
‘Reasonable value’ and ‘transaction’; an institutionalist 
contribution in value theory 
An analysis of value that recognizes power and authority as central forces in 
the process of social valuation cannot be complete without the discussion of the 
principles and the theoretical framework for the analysis of conflicts of power and 
interest, and an account of the constitution of a system of prices. The notion of 
‘reasonable value’, which was introduced by John R. Commons, can direct such an 
analysis of economic value. [12] Reasonable value developed as part of the broader 
theoretical research program on the resolution of economic disputes and of the 
necessary institutions for their administration. In the core of this program lies 
the question of the ‘formation and distribution of social welfare’ (Commons 1934/ 
1961, pp. 679), a problem that is also related to the establishment of the monetary 
system. Along reasonable value, Commons defined the important notions of 
‘economic transaction’ [13] and ‘institution’ [14], effectively laying the foundation of 
institutional economics as we know it today. 
Reasonable value is introduced in an attempt to explain the process of valuation in 
the many instances that the market is unable to calculate the price. [15] The failure 
of the market combined with the absence of a ‘neutral’ mechanism that can establish 
but also legitimize valuation open the space for the antagonism between the agents 
that are directly involved in the possible transaction, the seller and buyer, but also 
of other agents in the society that may have a stake in the specific transaction. The Journal of Philosophical Economics VI:2 (2013) 14
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Valuation becomes then the object of social dispute to be decided by collective 
action, the result of which is the introduction of ‘administered/ bargained prices’, 
constrained by the forces of supply and demand, by power relations, informal 
custom and institutional rules. Collective action, for Commons, has a much broader 
meaning here than the mere aggregation of individual actions that characterizes 
an idealized ‘free market’; collective action is perceived by the acting individuals 
as the institutional framework of rules that regulates their actions, including the 
unorganized custom, the laws of the state and the common law of the courts, the 
activities of groups and organizations such as trade unions and business firms 
and any other mode of action that society sanctions of, or imposes to, its members. 
The task that institutional economics sets for itself in the process of the analysis 
of reasonable value is two-fold; on the one hand it needs to outline the theoretical 
principles for the correct evaluation of the reasonable value in the absence of the 
market price. At the same time it should describe the institutional structure, i.e. the 
collectively accepted rules, that should regulate the negotiation of the price but also 
enforce its acceptance by all parties. 
Commons proposed a set of general and abstract factors that should direct and 
substantiate the research of the content of reasonable value. These principles were 
introduced and developed by Commons both in his book Institutional Economics 
(Commons 1934/ 1961) as well as in an earlier paper entitled Reasonable Value 
(Commons 1924), which is exclusively dedicated in their analysis. Efficiency, 
scarcity, sovereignty, custom and futurity (in the sense of forward looking), are the 
factors that substantiate reasonable value, but also condition economic behavior in 
general.  These five factors are devices that can direct empirical research, organizing 
the theoretical system necessary for the analysis of the facts gathered, facts that 
should also be used to enhance our understanding of the theoretical framework 
used. The outcome of the research around the constitutive factors of reasonable 
value can contribute to the development of a more general theory of economic 
value, as it is shaped by social antagonism, comprised of elements of institutional 
analysis and ‘negotiation psychology’ (Rutherford 1994, pp. 15). Such research tries 
to capture the complexity of real disputes and the richness of the variety of instances 
of negotiation around the calculation of a reasonable value.  
The theoretical system for the analysis of the factors that substantiate and direct 
the process of the establishment of reasonable value, should be complemented by the 
investigation of the rules and institutions that are necessary for the regulation of 
the negotiation of the process of economic valuation as well as for the establishment The Journal of Philosophical Economics VI:2 (2013) 15
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of a reasonable outcome expressed in prices. Reasonable value has also to do with 
the legal rules established as the ostensible basis on which the negotiation and the 
decision around its establishment are organized and explained. These rules give rise 
to institutional structures that gives rise to the economic system. Common refers 
often to custom, common law, and formal rules, while he stresses the importance of 
courts and particularly of the Supreme Court as the sovereign institution that can 
resolve disputes and constitute new rules. Courts can intermediate the antagonism 
around the question of a reasonable value, nevertheless it is also the government that 
intervenes indirectly especially through monetary and fiscal policies. The monetary 
system is an institution and a governance structure aiming not only to facilitate the 
circulation and the accounting of economic value but also to regulate the process 
of collective bargaining around the valuation of commodities and services. The 
government is actively employing the monetary system, in order to mediate the 
social antagonism between different stakeholders in the economy by influencing the 
level of prices, of wages and of interest rates. The aim of the government, if we apply 
Commons’ analysis of reasonable value, is to intervene in the social antagonism 
around the constitution of prices, safeguarding a reasonable and efficient outcome, 
while maintaining the reliance and justice of the price system. In many cases where 
imbalances of power between the stakeholders, lock-ins or monopoly structures exist, 
government action is necessary in order to compensate for the inequalities and to 
safeguard the reasonableness of the outcome of the valuation. A clear understanding 
on the institutional and the conceptual factors that influence the process of 
valuation and contribute towards a reasonable value are imperative for the success 
of such interventions. 
Conclusions
The paper introduced a theoretical synthesis of the state theory of money and of 
the original institutional economic analysis, referring to the work of John R. 
Commons and his understanding of ‘reasonable value’. The synthesis between the 
state theory of money and the principle of reasonable value can lay the foundations 
of a theoretical program for an institutionalist analysis for economic value. In 
the proposed framework, the calculation of economic value and the constitution 
of the system of prices are the outcome of a process of economic and political 
negotiation, which is framed by a wider institutional framework that includes but 
is not exhausted by the market system. The state has an active role as a mediator of 
this negotiation, employing money as one of the main instruments of intervention The Journal of Philosophical Economics VI:2 (2013) 16
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in the social antagonism between the competing groups that try to influence the 
system of prices. Money is not just a neutral unit of account, or a contrivance 
that facilitates economic exchange, but rather a system of rules that regulates the 
process of the constitution of the system of prices and one of the main vehicles 
for normalizing the social antagonism around the constitution of the system of 
prices and the distribution of production. The suggestion that money can be used 
as instrument for the regulation of economic system is by no means new. Keynes 
proposed the active management of the supply of money as an important tool for 
achieving economic objectives, and up to an extent, also the ideal of the optimal 
supply of money championed by monetarists, is nothing more than an indication of 
the ability of the state to resolve economic disputes and to achieve compromises by 
indirectly intervening in the market through money, so much that we could argue 
that money is not just an expression of the exchange relations of commodities and 
services but the economic institution par excellence. In that sense the question of 
social antagonism and of the ‘battle for economic existence’ that were addressed by 
Max Weber in his analysis of the relations between the economic, the social and the 
political, relations that are still part of the research agenda of Political Economy 
and Economic Sociology, could be re-framed also in ‘monetary terms’. 
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Endnotes
[1] ‘It is important to emphasize that intentionality does not imply any special 
connection with intending, in the ordinary sense in which I intend to go to the 
movies tonight. Rather, intentionality is a very general notion having to do with the 
directedness of the mind. Intending in the ordinary sense is simply a special case 
of intentionality in this technical sense, along with belief, desire, hope, fear, love, 
hate, pride, shame, perception, disgust, and many others.’ (Searle 2005, pp. 6).
[2] ‘Value exists in our consciousness as a fact that can no more be altered than can 
reality itself. The subjectivity of value, therefore, is first of all only negative, in the 
sense that value is not attached to objects in the same way as is color or temperature. 
The latter, although determined by our senses, are accompanied by a feeling of their The Journal of Philosophical Economics VI:2 (2013) 17
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direct dependence upon the object; but in the case of value we soon learn to disregard 
this feeling because the two series constituted by reality and by value are quite 
independent of each other.’ (Simmel 1900/ 1990, pp. 60).
[3] ‘The busiest streets of London are crowded with shops whose show cases display 
all the riches of the world, Indian shawls, American revolvers, Chinese porcelain, 
Parisian corsets, furs from Russia and spices from the tropics, but all of those 
worldly things bear odious, white paper labels with Arabic numerals and laconic 
symbols £.s.d. This is how commodities are presented in circulation’ (Marx 1878/ 
1975, pp. 87).
[4] ‘There can be nodal points within the field of signification because any system 
of signification is structured around an empty place [here that of economic value] 
resulting from the impossibility of producing an object which, none the less, is 
required by the systematicity of the system.’ (Laclau 1996, pp. 40).
[5] ‘[Say] went on to show that price is a measure of value and that value is a 
measure of utility. Hence price measures utility, from which it originated. Price 
measures (determines the amount of) utility, and utility determines price – well, 
well, well! Taken together with Say’s law of market everything becomes equal to 
everything else.’ (Foster 1942/ 1981a, pp. 889), reference in Tool (1998, pp. 43).  
[6] ‘Unless the commodities used for exchange bear some relation to a fixed standard 
we are still dealing with a barter [because], the parties in barter-exchange are 
comparing their individual needs, not values in the abstract’ (Grierson 1978, pp. 16-
19) quote in Ingham (2000, pp. 27).
[7] ‘What is the nature of those little disks or documents, which in themselves 
seem to serve no useful purpose, and which nevertheless, in contradiction to the 
rest of experience, pass from one hand to another in exchange for the most useful 
commodities, nay, for which everyone is so eagerly bent on surrendering his wares?’ 
(Menger 1892, pp. 240). A more recent elaboration of the problem along with a 
solution is offered in Kovenock & De Vries (2002).
[8] ‘Despite the inexorable growth of bank credit-money, orthodox academic 
economists clung, with increasing desperation, to the anachronistic theory. Their 
model of money supply was in effect, an empirical generalization of a naturally 
constrained supply of metallic monetary base provided by a central authority (the 
mint) that was outside the market. That is to say, in the terminology of the late 
twentieth century, it was exogenous. The retention of the commodity theory and its The Journal of Philosophical Economics VI:2 (2013) 18
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assumptions was achieved by maintaining a sharp distinction between money proper 
and credit. The credit supply was seen as the top of a large inverted pyramid on the 
narrower base of the gold standard’. (Ingham 2004, pp. 22).     
[9] ‘Hence, in a very narrowly defined sense, in a social theory of value money is 
value; but precisely because it is socially constituted, its invariance is not guaranteed 
by any ‘natural’ ground, and must be continually maintained by further social 
institutions, such as the development of double entry accounting and financial 
institutions such as banks. ... This stress on the importance of the legal setting of 
the algebra of double entry accounting is derived from Ellerman (1986), although it 
can be traced back to the work of John R. Commons in the 1930’s. What was missing 
from the older institutionalist tradition, however, was a model that expressed how 
this expansion of value at the individual level is constrained by the social structures 
at the level of the market system.’ (Mirrowski 1991, pp. 572).
[10] ‘This analysis lends itself to the Durkheimian interpretation, whereby Wergeld 
may seem as a ‘collective representation’ for which the analogue is the structure of 
society’. (Ingham 2004, pp. 92).
[11] When Knapp is analyzing the source of value of commodity money he refers 
to ‘real satisfaction’ and ‘satisfaction derived from its ‘value in exchange’’: ‘The 
possibility of real satisfaction is undoubtedly necessary for any commodity becoming 
a socially recognized exchange-commodity. If metals had not been indispensable in 
handicrafts autometalism would have never arisen. But there is ‘real’ satisfaction 
in every commodity which is taken in exchange. A man who barters a sheep for 
wooden dishes takes the dishes only because they give real satisfaction, i.e. because 
he can use them. But the dishes do not thereby become socially recognized exchange-
commodities. The possibility of ‘real’ use is therefore essential if a commodity (e.g. 
a metal) is to be chosen as a socially recognized exchange-commodity; but this 
property is insufficient to make it a means of payment.’ (Knapp 1905/ 1924, pp. 5-6).  
[12] For Commons, money is debt as well as a means for the extinction of debt, as in 
the state theory of money. (Commons 1934/ 1961, pp. 473).
[13] ‘The ultimate unit of activity … must contain in itself the three principles 
of conflict, dependence, and order. This unit is the transaction. … Transactions 
intervene between the production of labor of the classical economists, and the 
pleasures of consumptions of the hedonic economists, simply because it is society The Journal of Philosophical Economics VI:2 (2013) 19
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that, by its rules of order [collective action], controls ownership of and access to the 
forces of nature [individual action].’ (Commons 1934/ 1961, pp. 58).
[14] ‘The formula of collective action in control of individual action, which is the 
‘institution’, gives us a mental tool of investigation, the application of which brings 
together the similarities and differences in the varied and innumerable economic 
activities’. (Commons, Parsons and Selig 1950, pp. 34).
[15] ‘Thus, one may assert that the core of neoclassical microeconomics is the theory 
of market-determined prices, while the core of institutional economics is the theory 
of administered/ bargained prices.’ (Kaufman 2006, pp. 45).
References 
Aglietta, Michel (2002), ‘Whence and Wither Money’ in Riel Miller, Wolfgang 
Michalski and Barrie Stevens (eds), The Future of Money, OECD, Paris, pp. 31 – 70.   
Bush, Paul D. and Marc R. Tool (2003), ‘Foundational Concepts for Institutionalist 
Policy Making’  in Paul D. Bush and Marc R. Tool (eds), Institutional Analysis 
and Economic Policy, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, pp. 1-46. 
Coase, Ronald H. (1994), Essays on Economics and Economists, University of 
Chicago Press, Chicago.   
Commons, John R. (1924), Reasonable Value, University of Wisconsin, Madison. 
______ (1924/ 1957), The Legal Foundations of Capitalism, The University of 
Wisconsin Press, Madison.
______ (1934/ 1961), Institutional Economics, The University of Wisconsin 
Press, Madison.
Commons, John R. Kenneth Parsons and Perlman, Selig, Economics of Collective 
Action (1950), The University of Wisconsin Press, Madison.
Davies, Glyn (2002), A History of Money; From Ancient Times to the Present Day, 
University of Wales Press, Cardiff.
Dewey, John (1988), The Collected Works of John Dewey 1925 – 1953, Volume 13: 
1938 – 1939, Southern Illinois University Press, Illinois. The Journal of Philosophical Economics VI:2 (2013) 20
Papadopoulos, Georgios (2013) ‘Money and value: a synthesis of  
the state theory of money and original institutional economics’,  
The Journal of Philosophical Economics, VI:2
Ellerman, David (1984), ‘Money, Barter and Convergence to Competitive Allocation’, 
Journal of Economic Theory, 26, 241-261.
Ferguson, Niall (2008), The Ascent of Money, Penguin, New York. 
Foster, J Fagg (1942/ 1981), ‘John Dewey and Economic Value’, Journal of 
Economic Issues, 15, 871-879.
______ (1949/ 1981) ‘The relation between theory of value and economic 
analysis’, Journal of Economic Issues, 15, 899-905.
Goodhart, Charles A. E. (1989), Money, Information and Uncertainty, 2nd Edition, 
Macmillan New York.
______ (1998), ‘The two concepts of money: implication for the analysis of 
optimal currency areas’, European Journal of Political Economy, 14, 407-432.
Grierson, Philip (1978), ‘The Origins of Money’, Research in Economic 
Anthropology, 1, 1-35. 
Hahn, Frank (1965), ‘On Some Problems of Proving the Existence of An 
Equilibrium in a Monetary Economy’, in Frank Hahn and F.P.R. Brechling (eds), 
The Theory of Interest Rates, Macmillan, New York, pp. 126-135.
Hodgson, Geoffrey (2006), ‘What are Institutions?’, Journal of Economic Issues, 40 
(1), 1-24. 
______ (2007), ‘Meaning of Methodological Individualism’, Journal of 
Economic Methodology, 14 (2), 211-226. 
______ (2007), ‘The Rise of Veblenian Institutional Economics’, Journal of 
Economic Issues, 41 (1), 325-340.
Innes, A. Mitchell, (1913), ‘What is Money?’, Banking Law Journal, 30, 377-408. 
______ (1914), ‘The Credit Theory of Money’, Banking Law Journal, 31, 151-
168.
Ingham, Geoffrey (1996), “Money is a Social Relation’, Review of Social Economy, 
54 (4), 507-529.
______ (2004), The Nature of Money, London, Polity.  The Journal of Philosophical Economics VI:2 (2013) 21
Papadopoulos, Georgios (2013) ‘Money and value: a synthesis of  
the state theory of money and original institutional economics’,  
The Journal of Philosophical Economics, VI:2
______ (2006), ‘Further Reflections on the Ontology of Money:  Response to 
Lapavistas and Dodd’, Economy and Society, 35 (2), 259-278.    
Kaufman, Bruce E. (2006), ‘The Institutional Theory of John R. Commons: 
Foundation for a Heterodox Labor Economics’, Andrew Young School of Policy 
Studies Research Paper Series, Working Paper 06-02, pp. 1-70.
Kaufman, George G. (1969), ‘More on an Empirical Definition of Money’, The 
American Economic Review, 59 (1), 78-87.
Keynes, John Maynard (1930), A Treatise on Money, Macmillan, London.
Knapp, Georg Friedrich (1905/ 1924), The State Theory of Money, Macmillan, 
London.
Kovenock, Dan and Casper De Vries (2002), ‘Fiat Exchange in Finite Economies.’ 
Economic Inquiry, 40 (2), 147-157.  
Laclau, Ernesto (1996), Emancipations, Verso, London.
Laidler, David (1969), ‘The Definition of Money; Theoretical and Empirical 
Problems’, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 1 (3), 508-525.
Marx, Karl (1878/ 1975), Collected Works, International Publishers, New York.
Menger, Karl (1892), ‘On the Origin of Money’, The Economic Journal, 2 (6), 239-255.
Mirowski, Philip (1991a), More Heat than Light; Economics as Social Physics, 
Physics as Nature’s Economics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
______ (1991b), ‘Postmodernism and the social theory of Value’, Journal of Post 
Keynesian Economics, 13 (4), 565-582.
Rutherford, Malcom (1994), Institutions in Economics: The Old and the New 
Institutionalism, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
Papadopoulos, Georgios (2009), ‘Between Rules and Power: Money as an Institution 
Sanctioned by Political Authority’, Journal of Economic Issues, 43 (4), 951-969. 
______ (2011), Notes towards a Critique of Money, Jan Van Eyck Academy, 
Maastricht. The Journal of Philosophical Economics VI:2 (2013) 22
Papadopoulos, Georgios (2013) ‘Money and value: a synthesis of  
the state theory of money and original institutional economics’,  
The Journal of Philosophical Economics, VI:2
Searle, John (2005), ‘What is an Institution?’, Journal of Institutional Economics, 1 
(1), 1-22.
Simmel, Georg (1900/ 1990), The Philosophy of Money, London, Routledge.
______ (1972), On Individuality and Social Forms, Chicago, Chicago University 
Press.
Tool, Marc (1986), Essays in Social Value Theory: a Neoinstitutionalist 
Contribution, M. E. Sharpe, New York. 
______(2000), Value Theory and Economic Progress: The Institutional 
Economics of J. F. Foster, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Boston.  
Tool, Marc and Warren Samuels (1989), The Economy as a System of Power, 
Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick.
Veblen, Thorstein (1899/1994), The Theory of the Leisure Clash, Dover, London.
Wray, L. Randall (1990), Understanding Modern Money: The Key to Full 
Employment and Price Stability, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham.
Georgios Papadopoulos holds a Master in Philosophy of the Social Sciences from 
the London School of Economics and is pursuing a PhD at the Erasmus University, 
Rotterdam (languagegames@gmail.com).